CIV-24-335-HE
05-31-2024
ALEXIS MCDONALD, JR., Plaintiff, v. AMANDA LILLY, et al., Defendants.
SUZANNE MITCHELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUZANNE MITCHELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, appearing pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis, is a state pretrial detainee housed at the Garfield County Detention Center. Doc. 1. He filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Amanda Lilley,the Garfield County detention facility (“Garfield County Jail”), and the State of Oklahoma. United States District Judge Joe Heaton referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4.For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the action without prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Although Plaintiff names “Amanda Lilly,” the Court's research reveals the correct spelling is “Lilley.”
Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless otherwise indicated.
I. Screening.
This Court must screen complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or its officer or employee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2010).
This Court construes “[a] pro se litigant's pleadings . . . liberally,” holding them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The Court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
II. Background and Plaintiff's claims.
In August 2023, Plaintiff was charged in Garfield County District Court with one count of aggravated trafficking in illegal drugs and one count of possession of a firearm after a felony conviction. State v. McDonald, Case No. CF-2023-199, https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=garfield&number =CF-2023-199&cmid=463776 (last visited May 16, 2024) (McDonald). That state prosecution is ongoing, and Plaintiff filed this action in April 2024.
Plaintiff claims he is being denied the right to defense representation “without coercion.” Doc. 1, at 5. Plaintiff is represented in the state prosecution by Defendant Lilley. See generally McDonald. He alleges that Defendant Lilley “told [him] that if [he] didn't wa[i]ve [his] preliminary hearing then the state would charge [him] with a life sentence.” Doc. 1, at 8. He also alleges Defendant Lilley refused his request for a bond reduction, told Plaintiff that the district attorney “doesn't like her and hasn't for years,” and “misinterpreted the law to [him] on several occasion,” providing two examples. Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lilley “refuses to put in any motions at [his] request.” Id. For relief, he seeks an “unbiased defense attorney” and that Defendant Lilley be held “financially [] or criminally” liable. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff next claims that he was deprived of the “right to have hal[]al meals as a [M]uslim,” in violation of the First Amendment, and was denied “confidential visitation” with his attorney, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 6-7, 9. He alleges that on February 28, 2024, he “had an interview with Lt. Childs about a piece of bacon [he] continuously find[s] on the Sunday night dinner tray in the supposed ‘veg[e]tarian beans.'” Id. at 9. He explains that “[e]ven after showing [Lt. Childs] he still denied the fact that the facility serves pork.” Id. He attests that he does his “[M]uslim prayers 5 times daily in Arabic.” Id. For relief, he asks for the jail to “serve hal[]al meals to [M]uslims” and to disclose “the nutritional facts of meals.” Id. at 7. He also claims his Eighth Amendment rights were “violated when the jail put [him] in a room next to [his] co-defendant/witness while [he] was speaking to [his] attorney.” Id. at 9. He alleges his “co-defendant could hear [their] entire conversation and even acknowledged the fact as [he] stood up to leave,” but the “jail and [his] attorney refuse to do anything about it.” Id. For relief, he asks the Court to hold “them” “criminally [] or financially [liable] for violating the no contact order with [his] co-defendant/witness on [his] criminal case.” Id. at 7.
III. Plaintiff fails to state a claim.
Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for various reasons. To start, Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 only authorizes relief against those who violate a person's civil rights while acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Defense lawyers do not fit this description: “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (dismissing § 1983 suit against public defender).
Plaintiff contends that his appointed criminal defense attorney provided ineffective representation by coercing him with threats of a life sentence and misrepresenting the law. Supra § II. He makes no allegations against Defendant Lilley other than that she was performing a lawyer's traditional function as counsel in the state criminal proceeding. Rather, his allegations are all about the functions of counsel in his criminal case, and so, cannot support a claim under § 1983. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 315. The complaint fails to state any § 1983 claim for relief against Defendant Lilley.
Plaintiff also names the State of Oklahoma as a Defendant. Doc. 1 at 1. Section 1983 is a “remedial vehicle for raising claims based on the violation of constitutional rights.” Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016). It does not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, and neither the states nor their agencies qualify as “persons” under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-67, 71 (1989); Wood v. Milyard, 414 Fed.Appx. 103, 105 (10th Cir. 2011). In short, § 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties.” Will, 491 U.S. at 66. So, the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the State of Oklahoma.
“Under Ex parte Young, [209 U.S. 123 (1908),] a plaintiff may avoid the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition on suits against states in federal court by seeking to enjoin a state official from enforcing an unconstitutional statute.” Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1146 n.8 (10th Cir. 2013). “[F]or the Ex parte Young exception to apply, plaintiffs must show that they are: (1) suing state officials rather than the state itself, (2) alleging an ongoing violation of federal law, and (3) seeking prospective relief.” Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff's claim falls outside this exception.
He also names the Garfield County Jail as a defendant. This Court must dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against the jail because a “detention facility is not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued.” White v. Utah, 5 Fed.Appx. 852, 853 (10th Cir. 2001); see Gaines v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 291 Fed.Appx. 134, 135 (10th Cir. 2008) (a county detention center “is not a suable entity”).
Plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915A(a) and § 1915(e).
IV. Leave to amend.
Ordinarily, the Court considers whether to allow a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint. Pro se plaintiffs should be given a reasonable opportunity to remedy defects in their pleadings. Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990). And opportunity to amend should be granted unless amendment would be futile. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109-10. An amendment would be futile if the amended claims would also be subject to immediate dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir. 2004).
The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his complaint but notes that the Court must abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) from hearing any amended claims that implicate the validity of his ongoing state prosecution. See Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023) (recognizing three categories of state cases to which Younger abstention applies: “(1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions” (quoting Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 670 (10th Cir. 2020))).
V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety, with leave to amend within twenty-one days of any order adopting this report and recommendation.
The undersigned advises Plaintiff of his right to file an objection to this report and recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before June 21, 2024, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Plaintiff that failure to make a timely objection to this report and recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This report and recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.
